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SPITLER V. JAMES.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
SIWM

R, ADMnISTRATOI, V. JAMES BT Ala
LUELLEN v. HARE.

When one in the course of business entrusts another with the form of a bill,
check, or note, duly signed or endorsed by himself, but in blank as to any or
allofthematerialparts, of date, amount, time or place of payment or name
of payee, the law wlnpresumethathe authorizes that otherto fill upthe blanks
consistently with the tenor and effect of the form.
If he limits the authority of that other by special instructions, and his in.
structions are disregarded, and the paper is completed n a manner not contemplated by him, he will not be answerable to the wrong-doer on the terms
of the instrument, nor to any one taking the same with notice of the wrong;
but he will be held liable to a bona je purchaser.
A bonae purchaser is one who for full value, obtains from the. apparent
owner a transfer of negotiable paper before it matures, and who has no notice
of any equities between the original parties, or of any defect in the title of the
presumptive owner.

THE first of the above named cases was an action against the

appellant as administrator of G. W. Spitler, by the appellees,
as holders, on a promissory note in the following form;
LAPo'rz, July 20, 1880.
" Twenty months after date, we promise to pay t6 the order of G. W. Spitler,
at the Bank of the State of Indiana, at the Laporte branch, seventeen hundred
and thirty-nine 8.100 dollars for value received, without any relief whatever
from valuation, appraisement or stay laws, with interest.
jRWn, & ]3[OpRINs."

01,739, 8-100.

Endorsed : "ray to the order of John Eason and D. 8 Eason. who compose
the firm of J. and D. S. Eason.

Gxonez W. 51'rrzu."
"Pay totho order of James, Kent, Santee & Co.
JomN EASor,
ID. S. EAsox."
"Late firm of J. & D. S. Eason, in liquidation."

The complainant alleged the transfer of the note by indorsement to the appellees for a valuable consideration, and before
due, and in the ordinary course of business, and its protest
for non-payment.
Appellent answered that when the said George W. Spitler
endorsed the paper in suit, it was simply a printed blank form,
promise to pay to the order
as follows: "after date
of
for value received, without any relief whatever
from valuation or appraisement laws." That the deeedent, at
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the request of the makers, and for their accommodation, placed
his name on the back of said*paper; that he was informedthat
the paper was to be passed to John Eason in part payment for
a stock of goods, and that he stipulated that the note, when
filled, "should not be made payable at a bank"; that afterward
said note was filled up, as it now appears, and delivered to said
John Eason, the words, "At the Bank of the State of Indiana,
at the Laporte branch," being inserted at the special request of
said John Eason, though at the time of said insertion, and at
the time of the delivery of said note, said John Eason was informed of the stipulation aforesaid made by said decedent, but
notwithstanding such information, insisted upon and procured
said words, cat the Bank of the State of Indiana, at the Laporte branch," to be inserted in said note, which was done
without the knowledge or consent of said decedent.
A demurrer to this answer was sustained by the court
below, and was the subject of this writ of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RAY, J.--It will be observed that in this case weare not called
upon to consider the effect of the alteration of a written instrument against the consent of a party toits execution. Therewas
neither erasion nor interlineation, but the fact that the maker,
whom the endorser entrusted with the right to fill certain blanks
in the paper, fixing the amount, the date, the time ofpayment
and the payee, in disregard of his trust, "inserted" or included
after the name of the payee in the blan4 space, a place where
payable. What are the consequences of this breach" of trust
upon the paper in the hands of an innocent holder? In England, the endorser would, perhaps, be discharged, because the
courts there now hold the maker not chargeable with a simple
breach of trust, but guilty of forgery: Awde v. Dixon, 6
Exch. 869, Rex v. Hart, 1 Moo. 0.0.486; Regina v. Wilson,
1 Den. 0. 0. 284. But this is recent law in England, and has
never been generally accepted as authority in this country :
Banc of Mo. v. Phillips,17 Mo. 29. Russell v. Langstaffe,
Douglas 514, was a case where one Galley, having had frequent
transactions with the plaintiff, a banker, and having overdrawn
his account, was refused any further advance without an in.
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dorser acceptable to the plaintiff. Upon this Galley applied to
the defendant, and he indorsed his name on five copper-plate
checks, made in the form of promissory notes, but in blank, no
sum, date or time of payment being mentioned in the body of
the notes. Galley afterward filled up the blanks for different
sums and dates as he chose. The plaintiff knew that the notes
were blank at the time of their indorsement. In a suit upon
these five notes, Lord MANSFIELD said: "The indorsement on
a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The
defendant said, 'Trust Galley for any amount, and I will
be his security. It does not lie in his mouth to say the incoisements were not regular.'"
The case of Awde v. Dixon was where the defendant agreed
to join his brother in making a promissory note for his accommodation provided R would also join. The defendant accordingly signed an instrument in the form of a promissory note,
a blank being left for the name of the payee. R refused to
join; and afterward the defendant's brother delivered the imperfect instrument to plaintiff for value, representing that he
had authority to deal with it, and plaintiff's name was inserted
as payee. The court admit the "position that a person who
puts his name to a blank paper impliedly authorizes the filling
of it up to the amount that the stamp will cover," but insist
that the plaintiff could not recover, because the prima facie
power to complete the instrument was coupled with a condition
unknown to the plaintiff. In plain language, a party may clothe
another with dl the indicia of authority to complete aninstrument to which he has attached his name in blank, and yet avoid
liability on the ground that he had imposed secret instructions
upon the agent limiting his apparent general power.
The peculiar practice at the English bar, which sustains
suggestive interruptions from the bench, furnishes here an
instance, a rare one we trust, in which the law comes from the,
counsel, the sophism from the court.
The counsel assert, "where a person intrusted with a negotiable instrument for a special purpose delivers it to another,
the mere contravention of the trust will not prevent the latter
from recovering, if a bona fide holder for value and without
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notice." PARE B. responds, "This is a false instrument."
The fraternal faith that trusts a blank form duly signed to a
brother's keeping, where such possession furnishesyrimafacie
proof of a power to complete the instrument, may challenge
our admiration for the confidence displayed; but that admiration wouldbe cbillpd, were we told that it involved no hazard
save to the stranger who trusted to the primafacie evidence
of power this possession involved; that the brother whose confidence was betrayed was held harmless by the law, and the
stranger who reposes no confidence, but acts upon what the
law admits is primafacie evidence, must alone suffer.
But'this dootrine of forgery, as applied to a plain case of
fraud or breach of trust, was discussed by Chief Justice PARSONS in Putnam et al. v. Sullivan et al., 4 Mass. 45, where it
was held that when one indorsed a blank paper, with the intention that something should afterward be written, to which the
name should apply as an endorsement, the writing of the wrong
thing was not a forgery, but a breach of trust, and he who had
reposed the confidence must suffer alone when it was violated
and the rights of an innocent party involved. In that case the
defendant, a merchant, had entrusted his clerk with his blank
indorsements, and one, by false pretenses, obtained them from
the clerk and used them, and it was decided that the filling of
the blanks was not a forgery, nor was it such a fraud as would
discharge the indorser against the indorsee, who had paid value
for the paper, and the liability was placed upon the ground
that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the loss
should be sustained by him who had given the confidence,
and thus enabled the fraud to be perpetrated.
In Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat. 189, it was held that a paper
sined in blank, and indorsed in blank, may be filled up either
as a common promissory note or a negotiable note; and the
person who indorsed it in blank will be liable on his indorsement to a holder for value.
In Michigan Insurance Company v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11,
the rule was stated that a bonafide holder of a bill of exchange
had the power implied to fill all the blanks in the bill. So it
was held in Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank v. &huyler et al.,
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7 Cow. 3837, that in the hands of a boma fide endorsee, the
endorser cannot question the transaction, though the blanks
may have been filled in a manner entirely different from the
understanding and expectation of the indorser when he put
his name upon the note.
. In Fullertonv. Sturges,4 Ohio St. 529, where T, and others,
sureties for C, signed an instrument payable to S, or order, in
blank as tu date, amount and time of payment, but with a private agreement that it should not be filled for more than $1,000
or $1,500, and delivered it to 0., the principal, to procure the
discount, and the instrument was presented by C, to S, the
payee, and filled up for the sum of $10,000, it was -declared
that one who intrusts his name in blank to another to procure
a discount, is liable to the full extent to which such other may
see fit to bind him, where the paperis taken in good faith without notice, actual or constructive, that the authority given has
been exceeded; that such blank signature has the effect of a
general letter of credit, and the rule is founded as well upon
the principle of general jurisprudence, which casts the loss,
when one of two innocent persons must suffer, upon him who
has putit inthe power of another to do the injury, as also upon
the rule of the law of agency, which makes the principal liable
for the acts of his agent, in violation ofhisprivate instructions,
when he has held the agent out as possessing more enlargvd
authority. This case was approved in Holland v. Hatch, 15
Ohio St. 464. "PARSoNs says of this primafacie evidence of
authority to fill the blanks, that as between the immediate parties and all others who have notice of any limitation in the
authority, this presumption may be rebutted, but as to bona
fide purchasers without notice, it is conclusive: Bills and Notes,
vol. 1, p. 109. To the same effect is Edwards on Bills 92, et seq.
.Upon the question of what constitutes a bona fide holder, the
law seems now well settled. In Belmont Branch Bank v. Hoge,
35 New York 65, it is declared that one who for full value
obtains form the apparent owner a transfer of negotiable paper
before it maturesand who has no notice of any equities between
the original parties, or of any defect in the title of the presumptive owner, is to be deemed a bonafideholder. He does
39

A0 o

SPITLER V. JAMES.

,not owe to the party who puts such paper in circulation the
,4iuty of active inquiry to avert the imputation of bad faith
The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple
,tst of honesty and good faith, and not by mere speculation
as to his probable diligence or negligence.
The case of Holland v. Hatch, 11 Ind. 497,is not in confli-t
with the authorities we have cited. It is there stated "that
all blanks may be filled which are necessary or proper to make
the instrument a perfect and complete bill of exchange, or
promissory note as the case may be." It is denied that the
addition of the words " without relief from valuation or appraisement laws" were necessary or proper to complete the bill
their addition is held to avoid the instrument. This case was
questioned in Holland v. Hatch, 15 Ohio St. 464, so far as it
held the bill void by reason of the additional stipulation.
In this case it was proper to complete the note and render
it negotiableby the law-merchant,to make it payable at a bank.
There was sufficient space for that purpose, and whatever question there may have beenwhile the note remained in the hands
of a party having notice of the limitation on the authority of
the maker imposed by the indorser, no defense can be based
upon such limitation when the paper has passed into the hands
of a bonafide holder.
I The principle which excludes defenses against instruments
negotiable by the law-merchant, in the hands of a purchaser
before due, for value and without notice of defects, would be
violated by every exception introduced, and the value of such
securities greatly lessened in the market.
.The sole question which should present itself to one receiving
such paper in the regular course of business is, whether the
signatures are genuine and the paper unaltered. It is doubtless
often convenient to indorse such instruments in plank and deliver the paper to the maker; but the act gives authority to
the holder to fill the blanks in conformity to the general character of the paper, and involves confidence in the integrity of
the person to whom the general authority is given. If, in violation of such trust, there be written within such blanks any
stipulation, usual to paper of the class indicated by the blank
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form, a bonafide holder willbe protected. It is not to be sup.
'Posed that a court, which has rigidly enforced the liability
of A surety under circumstances involving the same principle
in the case of an official bond, should hesitate in its application to a negotiable note.
We have held that where the obligee accepts an instrument,
perfect in form and execution, which comes to him from the
person who should have possession of the instrument for the
purpose of such delivery; that the obligee may accept it without
farther inquiry. The entire transaction, so far as the obligee
is involved, is according to the ordinary and natural course.
The surety, however, while he executes the instrument and
places it in the usual channel for delivery, departs from the
ordinary course of procedure by circumscribing the general
authority by a condition unknown to the obligee. The condition is disregarded, a fraud is accomplished and he who has
not scrupled to trust his principal with the semblance of a
general authority to make the delivery, must stand the hazard
he has incurred : The State ex rel v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 70. See
alsoDeardoffv. Forseman5 Am. Law,Reg., N. S., 539; S.0.
24 Tnd. 481, where the rule was applied to a note negotiable
under the statute.
It appears by the complaint and answer that the note was
endorsed in a blank form, and without alteration, erasure or
interlineation, was filled up as a note negotiable by the lawmerchant, and in that condition was, before due, and in the
ordinary course of business, for value transferred to the plaintiff. The act of the decedent enabled the maker to put the paper in this condition into the market,and the consequences must
rest upon the estate. The demurrer was properly sustianed
The judgment affnmed.
1
LUELLEN ET AL 'V. HARE.

Tis was an action by the appellee upon a promissory
in the following form:
note
IAWATOLTIS, Im., Jan. 2 186.
UIIDI
"Erchange for $IOO.
"On orbefore the irst day of May next we pay to the order of M. L. Hare,
lSee preceding case, p. 605.
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one tho sand dollars, at the IndlanapolS Branch Bank, for value reoeived,
without any reliefwhatever from valuation or appraisement laws of the State
oflniljana

AUGUSTUS WYLvRA,
BExAxm

LUrLLzN,

WILLLMx HANCOOC."

Luellen and Hancock answered, denyingthe execution of the
instrument. The answer was sworn to. Weaver was defaulted. "
The jury found a general verdict for the appellee. They also
returned special answers to interrogatories as follows :
1. Was the note sued or delivered to the defendant
Weaver at his request, and for his accommodation, in the
following form, to wit:
KOKOXO, IND.,-

PRxohange fbr $1,000.
Pay to the order of
_-

186

Dollars, at
Value received, without any relief whatever from

valuation or appraisement laws of the State of Indiana.
To

-

BzN$mAIN LuxwAmE,
Winnux K"Olcr."

Answer-It was.
2. Did the plaintiff fill up the blank referred to in the first
interrogatory in the form in which it now appears?
Answer-He did.
3. Did the defendants,Luellen and Hancockhave any know.
ledge of or consent to the filling up of said blank by plaintiff ?
Answer-They did not.
The appellant moved for judgment on the special finding
in disregard of the general verdict. The motion was overruled and judgment entered for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RAY, J.-In Spitler,Ad.v.J'ames et al., at this term (ante p.605)
we held that when one affixedhis signature to a blank form he
primafadeauthorized the instrument to be filled as such forms
are usually completed. That if the form was that of a promissory note, it might be filled either as a note recognized by our
statute or bythe common law.there being no special indicatious
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restricting it to either class, and that being so perfected, when
in the hands of a bonafideholder, thisprimafacie presumption
of authority could not be questioned.
The issue here presented is the converse of the one there
discussed. Can the party receiving such a blank form fill it
up in a manner different from its tenor and legal effect?
Here the form was a bill of exchange, signed by the appellants as drawers and requesting the person to whom it should
be addressed to pay to the order of-

$-

, at -

.

This authorized the holder to fill the blank address, the date,
amount and the place where payable. The intent of the
drawers was to assume a liability secondary to the party who
should become the acceptor. As the form was filed, it imposed a primary liability-upon the appellants and one clearly
not contemplated when they executed the inktrument. There
oan be no question that the writing of words calculated to
change the legal effect of other words already written, is to
all intent as fully an alteration of the instrument, as an erasure
and substitution would be. Such alteration,ofcourse,discharges
the surety or maker where, as in this case, it is done without
his consent, and the paper remains within the hands of the
party chargeable with the alteration.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with directions to
the court below to enter judgment for the appellants.

L The decision of the Court of
King's Bench, in Rusell v. Langstaffe, Doug. 514, is still the law of
England, and has been affirmed in
every State in this country in which
the question has been passed upon.
The general doctrine is, that if A
signs his name as maker or endorser
upon a blank bill, check, or note, and
delivers the same to B he authorizes
B to complete the instrument; and a
bona fide holder, for value and withont notice, may recover from A on
the same, even although in complet.

Ing it B has exceeded his authority
and bound his principle in a manner
consistently with its tenor; but not
contemplated, or even expressly pro.
hibited by hin.
As in the act of delivery he has con.
stituted B his agent to control the
paper, a stranger may pronerly assume that B is authorized to issue it,
from the sufficient fact of his having
it within his control; and, inasmuch
as by the commercial law such a docu.
meat is of the nature of a letter ox
.redit, without reserve, ta all the
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world, if the stranger takes it for
value, and without notice of the restriation upon B's authority, it is as
if he took it direct from A in the
course of commerce; the burden of
successfully impeaching it rests upon
the latter, and in a suit thereon he
cannot deny that it is his merely because it is not exactly what he privately intended it to be. The law can
presume no otherintent than such as is
clearly deducible from the transaction
in the aspect in which it is presented
to the public, and the apparent authority is regarded as the real authority,
no matter what is their actual difference. In supporting a defense A
must necessarilyadmit his signature as
his deed, and as he is thereby estopped
from averring that the instrument as
proffered was not cotnplete when he
executed It, so he cannot, of course,
allege a material alteration in the
paper after it was made, and he is accordingly without ground to stand
upon: V0cett v. Pcton, 5 Cr. 142
But waiving for a moment the principle of estoppel which confronts him
at the outset, and assuming his case
not to be one of the exceptional class,
hereafter noted, in which the liability
is incurred by negligence in not effectually preventing or stopping the circulation of a bill, it will be seen that,
besides the signature, he must also
admit his intent to issue paper, and
the delegatAon of authority to perfect
that intent. If then, going thus
far, he denies that his agent has carried out his intent in manner and
form as instructed, he should show
that the special mode prescribed by
him was public as the authority
given, or, at all events, he should
bring the formerhome to the notice
of the purchaser, to sustain a valid
tlefense as against him. Otherwise he

may raise an issue between himself
and his agent as to whether there was
or was not such restriction (which the
latter may deny), but the presumption
of a general authority which he has
himself created, and which in Its legal
operation has been in no manner qual.
ified will not be rebutted by the decision of the issue, one way or the
other. And this, because, under the
circumstances, the law will not permit
a principal to defend on the ground
that, although publicly he authorized
his agent to act for him in a general
way, privately he did not, but limited
his authority.
IL It has been recently suggested
that perhaps the obligation created by
blank makings and endoriements depends on the principles of estoppel,
and not on any peculiarity of negotiable paper, and the force of the suggestion will be seen in the foregoing
remarks; but probably the principles
applicable are referable to the law ot
agency which seemsto offerthe firmer
ground for them. The doctrine of
general jurisprudence, that where one
of two innocent parties must suffer,
he should bear the loss whose act has
caused the injury, has also been generally'relled upon in the cases, and in
some of them has ruled the decision:
Ingham v. Primrose,7 C. B. 82; S. C.,
28 L. J. C. P. 295.
IEL The paper at delivery may be
entirely. blank above the signature,
or in the form of an ordinary printed
bill or note, with the material parts
in blank, and the spaces may be filled
in with any date, time of payment,
amount, place of payment, or payee,
provided this he done consistently
with the legal import or tenor of the
form signed or endorsed: Orrick v.
Colston, 7 Grat. 189; Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45; Bankc v. Schuleri
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and Mitchel v. Culver, 7 Cow. 337; other way: Byles on Bills, 5 Amer.
Douila -f. Scot, 8 Leigh. 43; Fuller- Edit. 282 307--such would have been
ton v. BSurge,4 Ohio W. S. 529; the principle upon which an innocent
Johnson v. Bardsdale, 1 S. & Mf. 11; holder for value, would have been
Bank v. Ctrr,, 2 Dana 143; Hunt. defeated in Luellen v. Rare, if de.
izgdot el al v. The Bank, 3 Alab. feated at all; and such was the ground
Je; Fibloe v. Patton, 5 Cr. 142; of the judgment in Awde v. Dixon, 6
Holland v. Hatch, 15 OhioN. S. 464; Excheq. 869. In that case the defendant agreed to join his brother in
2brry v. Ask, 10 S. & Mf. 590; irwich Bank v.: Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; making a promissory note for the acRobertson v. Smith, 18 Alab. 220; commodation of the latter, provided
Moodl4 v. Therekeld, 13 Geo. 155; one R would also join; and he signed
It'esv. The Bank, 2 Allen 236; Col- the instrument thus, "-Decen., 1848,
lis v, Emmet, 1 31. BI. 313; Smth T. ." On demand we do hereby jointly
Mangay, 1 M. & S. 86; Cruchlel v. "and severally promise to pay to
, or order, 1001. as wit
Clarence, 2 Mf & S. 90; Montague v. "Mr.
William
Perkins, 22 E. C. L. R. 516; chultz "ness our hands -v. Astley, 2 Scott 815; Awde v. Dix- "Dixon." Such a document, being a
on, 6 Excheq. 809; 1 Bell's Comms. joint and several engagement executed
Laws of Scotland 390; Fisher v. Web- by oneparty, was certainlyincomplete;
ster, 8 Cal. 112; McArthur V. Mcand it was on this ground that pAumz
Leod, 6 Jones, Law, 475.
the case, and the
IV. An instrument with an incon- B., distinguished
court held that the defendant should
upon
sistency or irregularity patent
have judgment. On the other hand
its face should put a purchaser on his
although in Merriam v. Rockwood, 4
guard, and if he chooses to take the
N. H. 8t, the arrangement betweeL
risk implied, in the course of business,
the principal and agent was of a simiand for value, he cannot claim the pro. lar character, Inasmuch as there was
tection afforded him who holds a note nothing to put the plaintiff upon his
with no apparent defect; Utosby v. guard, it was held that he might reGrant, 36 N. H. 273; Goodman v. cover. There a surety signed a negoS&monds,

20

How.

343;

York

Ins. tiable note and delivered it to the

Co. v. Brooks, 3 Am. Law Reg., N. person he intended to accommodate,
S., 402; Mehaiwe Bank v. Douglas 31 upon condition that it shored not be
Conn. 170. If therefore, the agent delivered to the payee or negotiated
fills in the blank, in such a manner elsewhere, until some other person
should also sign it as surety, but,
inasmuch as there was nothing on the
face of the paper indicating that any
other was expected to become a party
thereto, and no fact was brought to
the knowledge of the payee, calculated
to suggest inquiry, the defense could
not avail: The Bank v. Goss. 31 Vt.

as to create a questionable appearance, one should make inquiry ore
he rely upon it. Such would be the
case of a bill drawn in England for
an amount larger than that covered
by the stamp; for there, as the stamp
is in the paper, the irregularity would
be patent; although in America,

where the stamps are attached, the 315; .lPkering v. Burk, 15 East. 38;
illustration would not be complete, Dixon v. Dixon, 3 Vt. 450; Haskins
and the decision would probably be the v. Lombard, 16 Maine, 140; Smith
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v. MoberZy, 10 B. Xlonr. 266; Dear- else of that authority rests In hIs dxa&
doff v. _bresman, 5 Am. Law Reg., cretion, he may, whilst still con rolling the paper, revoke one filling u,
N. S., 539; S.C. 24Ind. 481.
V. The authority implied from the and make another. This would not
making of a blank instrument for ac- be the case of an alteration after
commodation, being merely In the making, which, if material, would
nature of a naked power not coupled avoid the note: Douglas v. BoU 8
with an interest (Smith's Execs, v. Leigh 43; Down" v. 2iclardson, 5
Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77), Is revoca- B. & Ald. 674; .Abrahm v. Sinner,
ble as long as delivery is not techni- 12 Ad. & E. 763; Paemore v. Niorth,
cally perfect, and the principal retains 18 East 517; Cox v. 2'roV, 5 B. &
the control of the instrament, either Aid. 474. Potheir, Trait6 du Contrat
In his own or in his agent's hands. De Change, d. 44, p. 1, ch. 3, s. 3.
Thus, if he signs a bill In blank, and
VL And finally, as the delegated
It is stolen from him, thebetter opinion power may be thus revoked by the
is, that unless negligence be shown, grantor as long as it remains merely
he will not be liable to any subse- a naked power, and the note is not
quent holder for value, without notice legally delivered, so It is revoked by
of the theft, for here there Is no de- his death; and, if the paper has not
livery; although there are some dicta been started on its course by that
the other way: Montague v. Perkins event, the agent's authority is gone,
22 1, J. C. P. 189; Ingham v. Prim- and the estate of &hedecedent cannot
rose, 28 I. J. C. P. 295; Byles on Bills, be held responsible on its subsequent
187 Eng. Edit. of 1870. If, again, he issue. And this is the law, whether
actually delivers the note to his agent, the bona fide purchaser for value has
he may subsequently withdraw it, notLce of the death or not: Smith's
provided there is still the naked power Execs. v. Wyickoff, 3 Sandf., ch.. 77;
between them, not made anything 3whiga Ins. Co. v. Leavenwortl, 3
more by the creation of a considera- Vt. 12.
tion, meritorious or valuable. Such
VII But such a revocation, if unan instance of a mere bailment is dertaken by the principal himself,
rare. But untila note, though com- must be effectual; and, accordingly,
plete, is issud it -'has no legal if, through any negligence of his own,
vitality .or enistence :" (Asst. V. C., 3 a note which after issue he intended
Saudf., oh. 77): .rarvin v. McuV.- to cancel, or before issue to retain, be
lum, 20 Johns. 283. At that moment. not retained or destroyed, but subsehowever, rights of others have vested, quently comes into the hands of a
and there is no power of revocation, bona flde holder for value, he will be
even as between the principal and his liable. This would be the case if he
agent; In a contest between whom was to crumple the paper into a ball
the former is bound by his contract, and throw it into a waste basket, from
whatever it be, if legal, although, as which it was taken entire, but withIn Luellen v. Hare, he cannot be held out his knowledge, by a clerk, anti put
to anything more. But if there is no into circulation: See the case of Ingrevocation, the authority of the agent ham v. Primrose,7 C. B. 82, where a
coatinues up to the time of the issue billwas inelfectuallytorn in two pieces.
of the note by him; and as the exer- In this connection a man might dent
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hit intent to Issue a note (vide ante), on it: Byles, Nng. edit., 1870, 187.
and set up that he had revoked his This, when legally done, he would not
agent's authority, but he could not do as agent of the agent, but by vir.
thus meet the new liability which he tue of the authority inherent in the
has incurred by his own negligence delivery to him of the principal's let
Independently of any prior circum- ter of credit, or engagement, which
delivery, in the absence of fraud, the
stances.
VIIM In Indiana the statute of latter would be estopped from denyAnne Is. not in force, and a legislative Ing as his own. And it is clear that
enactmenthasplacedpromissory notes a bonaflde endorsee cannot be defeaton the same footing with inland bills ed merely because he knew that the
of exchange by the law-merchant, if paper when endorsed by the defendpayable at a chartered bank wihin the ant was in blank: itcwhll v. Clver,
State: Rev. Stat., 138, 1 Blackf. 14. 7 Cow. 386; FYieerton v. &urges. 4
81. Hence the remark in Spiler v. Ohio, N. S., 29 ; Hurtington et al. v.
James,that "it was proper to complete 27V&eBank, 3 Ala. 186; Schultz v.
2 Scott 816. And it ieerns
the note and render it negotiable by Astlei,
the law-merchant, to make it payable that if an agent in filling up a blank
at a bank." In that case, accordingly note exceeds his authority, and a
the defendant was held bound by an third person receives the note with a
act which made the paper negotiable knowledge that the authority was
contrary to his express instructions, limited and has been transcended, the
and so materially affected his liability. note will not be void in toto, but only
This was fully warranted by the au- for the excess beyond the sum which
thorities. It rested with the agent to was authorized. It is not the case of a
fill
up the paper according to the com- forgery, but of a breach of trust: Tohn
mon law, or to the statute of his State, aon v. Blasdale,l S. & M. 11; 2brr
as it did in Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat. v. -tsk, 10 S. & . 810; 1 Cromp. A
189,
in Virginia, where the statute of Jerv. Excheq. 316; Goss v. Whitehead,
Anne likewise was not in force, and 33 Mississippi 213.
X. It will be borne in mind that
the word "assigns" was used.
IX. If a holder for value is to be the doctrine discussed relates to the
affected by notice, it must be such as making of bills or notes, and not to
has been indicated as upon the face of their alteration after they are made
the instrument itself, or a notice of (as to which latter point, vide Goodthe limitation of the authority of the man v. -atman, 4 N. H. 455; Woragent so as to render the holder, in rail v. Gheen, 39 Penna. St. R. 888;
the event of a breach of that authori- Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. -0), and that
ty a party thereto, when of course, there is a difference in nuw between
ho could no more profit by the wrong what is technically known as an en.
done than could the agent himself: dorsement in bl~nk, and the signing
Will v. Sweetzer, 5 N. H. 368; Bank or endorsing of blank notes or bills,
v. Phitps, 17 o. 29. Without such and although in the former instance
notice as this a stranger to the prin- a contract may, in some of the States,
cipal may fill up the instrument under be written over the name, the legal
the direction, express or implied, of principles applicable are not pertinent
Wi.W. W.
the agen, and subsequently recover to the present inquiry.

WALLING V POTTE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
SIMEONI M. WALLING V. GEORGE POTTER.
A personrecelving transientaccommodation at an inn,for whichheis charged
by the innkeeper, is a guest and entitled to all the rights of a guest, althougit
he be not actually a traveler.

AcTION on the case against the defendant as an innkeeper
to recover money stolen from the plaintiff while a guest at the
inn. The following facts were found by the Superior Court:
The plaintiff lost money at the defendant's inn, under such
circumstances that he is entitled to recover therefor the sum
of $60, if the relation of innkeeper and guest existed between
the parties. The defendant it was admitted was an inn keeper.
The plaintiff and defendant both resided in the town of Kent,
and the inn was in Kent, about half a mile from the plaintiff's
residence. The plaintiff came to the inn on anevening, staid
there over night, and took breakfast there; and paid the defendant for his night's lodging and breakfast the usual charge
for such entertainments.
The plaintiff claimed that on these facts he was a guest at
the inn, and entitled to treat the defendant as an innkeeper
and hold him responsible as such. The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff was not a traveler or a wayfaring man, and not
a guest at the inn so as to be authorized to charge the de.
fendant as innkeeper for the loss claimed.
- The question of law arising on the facts was reserved for
the advice of this court.
Hubbard and Andrews, for the plaintiff, cited Thompson v.
Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283; Parkerv. Flint, 12 Mod. 255;
Peet v. c Graw, 25 Wend. 653; 1 Parsons on Cont. 572, 610;
Jones on Bailm. 35; 3 Bac. Abr., Innkeeper, C. 4; 2 Kent
Com. 595 ; Towson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47;
Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280; Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R.
273; York v. Griadstone,1 Salk. 388; Galley v. Clerk, Oro.
Jac. 188; Beedle v.Morris, Id. 224; S. C., Yelv. 162; Jones
v. Osborn, 2 Chitty 484.
0. . Seymour and Knapp, for the defendant, cited 1 Swift
Dig. 550; Thompson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283; 2 Parsons
on Cont., 5th ed. 150; Berkskire Woolen Company v. Proctor
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7 Cush. 417; Story on Bailm., § 477; Dean's Commercial
Law, § 481; 3 Bac. Abr., Innkeeper, C., 5; Calye's Case, 8
Coke 32; Grinnell v. Cooks, 3 Hill 485; Smith's Lead. Cas.
266; Jones on Bailm. 110.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OARPENTR, J.-The plaintiff and defendant were residents

of the same town. The defendant was an innkeeper, and the
plaintiff took lodging and breakfast at his inn, paying therefor the usual charge for such entertainment. While at the defendant's inn the plaintiff lost a sum of money, and the court
has found that he is entitled to recover the sum. lost, provided
the law is so that the relation of innkeeper and guest existed
between the parties. Whether such relation existed or not
is the question and the only question resolved.
An inn has been judicially defined as "a house where the
traveler is furnished with everything which he has occasion
for while on his way :" Th/rnpson v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald.
283. A guest is one who patronizes an inn as such. But it
is said that none but a traveler can be a guest at an inn in a
legal sense. We do not suppose that the court intended, in the
definition above quoted, to lay stress upon the word traveler.
It is used in a broad sense to designate those who patronize
inns. In Wintermute v. Clark, 5 Sandf. 247, the court say,
that in order to charge a party as an innkeeper, it is not necessary to prove that it was only for the reception of travelers
that his house was kept open, it being sufficient to prove that
all who came were received as guests without any previous
agreement as to the time or terms of their stay. A public
house of entertainment for all who choose to visit it, is the
true definition of an inn. These definitions are really in harmony with each other. Webster defines a traveler as "one
who travels in any way." Distance is not material. A townsman or neighbor may be a traveler, and therefore a guest at
an inn, as well as he who comes from a distance, or from a
foreign country. If he resides at the inn, his relation to the
inn-keeper is that of a boarder; but if he resides away from
it, whether far or near, and comes to it for entertainment as
a traveler and receives it as such, paying the customary rates,
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we know of no reason why he should not be subjected to all
the duties of a guest, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of one. In short, any one away from home, receiving
accommodations at an inn as a traveler is a guest, and entitled to hold the innkeeper responsible as such.
The Superior Court must be advised to render judgment
for the plaintiff.
and diet in his house, and letting
stables for their horses is not an innkeeper.
But where the houses clearly aninn,
and in the language of O xzy, Ch.
J., in Wintermute v. Gark, 5 Sandf.
S. C. 242, "a public house of entertainment for all who choose to visit
it," the presumption certainly will be
that one who takes lodging there, for
a single night, is to bd regarded as a
guest, and especially so when he submits to the ordinary terms of other
guests.
Where one lives in the same town,
he cannot compel the innkeeper to
receive him as a guest. But unloubt.
edy, by special agreement, the innkeeper may receive him as such; and
if he do, cannot excuse imself from
his ordinary responsibility by showing that his guest was not a traveler. He should insist upon his right
not to receive him as a guest, or
else, after agreeing to receive him as
a guest, he must submit to the legally
implied consequences growing out of
the relation. And where the house
is clearly an inn, and the person is
received and entertained in the ordinary mode of entertaining guests, the
legal implication must be that he is
received as a guest, and he will be en8
case,
are not travelers. In CaMye's
which
Co. Rep. 32, it is said "it ought to titled to demand the protection
around the property of
be a common inne" for "passengers the law places
guests at such places.
and not for neighbors." And h 1Prk.
I.E.
hurst v. Fbster, I Salk. 387, it was
held that one taking lodgers to lodge
The New York Court of Appeals, in
v. X'ood, 33 N. Y. 577,
n
ngaUsbee
He7d. that one who merely leaves his
horse and carriage at the stables of an
inn is not to be regarded as a guest;
but the general rule is certainly otherwise; York v. Grindstone, 1 Salk.
883; S. U., 2 Ld. Ray. 866; Yelv. 67;
Redleld on Bailments, § 587, and cases
cited. The question is ably present,'l
by Wiu.iD J., in Mason V. Thompsoi,
9 Pick. 280. It has never been regarded as important, in modern times,
until this case in New Yorl that the
guest should receive any personal
refreshment in order to secure the
protection of his horse and carriage,
while lodged in the keeping of the
innkeeper for refreshment and care
for reward. Lord HOLT dissented
from the opinion of the court, in ork
v. Greenough, 2 Ld. Ray 866; but
his views seem not to have gained any
acceptance until the decision in New
York, which was by a divided court.
But the question, how far the guest
must be really, and in truth, a "traveler" or "wayfarlng man," seems
not to have received much discussion
in the courts. The early definitions
seem to assume that the host is not
obliged to receive any as guests, who
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W TMORE.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
InTLE MIAMI RAIROAD COMPANY V. WETMORE.
Where a passenger at a railroad depot, while having his baggage checked,
got into an altercation 'with the baggage-master and was strck by him with a
hatchet, the company were not liable for the injury.

Tms was an action in the court below, by defendant in error
against the railroad company, to recover damages for injury
occasioned by an assault, committed by one of the agents of
the company, as averred, while he was acting within the
scope of his employment.
The facts were, that Wetmore went with his baggage to the
depot of the railroad company and requested the baggagemaster, one ialpine, to check his baggage. Wetmore testified
that Halpine replied he would "check it when he got ready"
and continued checking other baggage which was arriving after
that of witness. After waiting some time and making several
requests to have his baggage checked,witness went around to
the inside of the counter on which baggage was placed, and
repeated his request; whereupon he was seized by Halpine and
violently pushed out of the enclosure. Witness then came up
again outside of the counterand shakinig his finger in Halpine's
face, told him he should suffer for his conduct; whereupon
Halpine took up a hatchet and struck witness on the head.
Halpine testified, that when witness came up to him first he
was getting checks for some other passengers who were there
first; that Wetmore was importunate and came inside the
enclosure and used abusive language; that he had merely
taken him by the arm and led him out, and that Wetmore
then came up with his hand under his coat, so that witness
thought he was going to draw a weapon, and witness took
up the hatchet and pushed him away with the end of it.
The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $7,000, on which
the court entered judgment. The case was now before this
court on writ of error.
D. nhew Wright, for plaintiff in error, cited Smith on Master
and Servant 183 (2d ed.); Story on Agency, § 452; Croft v.
Alison, 4 B. & Ald. 590; fcManus v. Crickett, 1 East, 67 ;
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Cox v. Kehey, 36 Ala. 340: Steamboat Ohio v. Stunt, 10 0. St.
582 ; Steamboat Messenger v. Pressler, 13 0. St. 255 ; Steamboat Ocean v. Marshall,11 0. St. 379; Ellis v. Turner. 8 1).
& E. 533 ; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 509; Mechanics'
Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326; Crocier v. N. L.
R.'R. Co., 24 Conn. 249 ; Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnpike
Co., 2 Conn. 479 ; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343 ; Roe v.
B. R.B. Co., 7 Eng. L. & E. 546; Goff v. Great N. B.R..
Co., 3 E. & E. 671 ; E. . B. B. Co. v. Brown, 6 Exch. 314 ;
Poulten v. L. & N. R. B. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 534 ; Mitchell v.
Crosweller, 13 C. B. 237; Story v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476;
Williams v. Tones, 11 Jurist N. S., 843; E. & C. B. B. Co.
v. Baum, 21 Ind. 70.
R. L. Burnett and John F. Follet for defendant in error,
cited Penn. B. B. Co. v. Yandiver, 42 Pa. St. 371 ; Joel v.
Mo'rrison, 6 0. & P. 501; Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 607;
Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush. 300 ; Redfield on Railways, sec.
130 (4 ed. ); Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen 49 ; Weed v.
P. B. R. Co., 5 Duer 193 ; Moore v. F. B. B. Co., 4 Gray
465 ; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen 420 ; Meyer v. Second Av. B.
R. Co., 8 Bosw. 305; Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 H. &. N. 355;
Kormh v. Ottawa, 32 Ills. 121; Chicago B. B. Co. v.McCarthy,
20 Ills. 385 ; Whatman v. Pearson, L. R. 3 0. P. 422.
It is laid down by all modern text writers as well as by the
overwhelming weight of the decisions, that the liability of the
master can not, in any case, be made to depend either upon the
intention of the servant, or the authority and consent of the
master. The master has nothing to do, either way, with the
purpose and intention of his servants. It is with their acts
alone that he is to be affected, and if these are done while engaged in his employment, the master is liable, whether committed carelessly or purposely-willfully or maliciously, or
'without malice and intention-upon the authority of the
master or without his consent and even in direct opposition
to his express commands. The act of the master is the employment of the servant.
The only criterion in a case like this, is, whether the act was
done while the servant was transacting the business of his
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master. If this is once established by the determination of a
jury,thereis no loop-hole for the master to escape responsibility.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Wum, 3.-There is no controversy as to the general rule
by which the question of the liability of the railroad company for the act complained of in the petition, is to be determined. The difficulty arises in the application of the rule to
the peculiar facts of the case.
Halpine, the person guilty of the wrong, as the servant of
the company wcs charged with the duty of checking the baggage of passengers, and whatever liability, if any, devolved
upon the company, for the consequences of his wrongful acts,
grew out of the relation of master and servant, which existed
between him and the company.
The general rule as to the liability of the master for the
wrongful acts of his servant, is thus stated by Mr. Smith in
his work on Master and Servant.
"A master is ordinarily liable to answer in a civil suit for
the tortions or wrongful acts of his servant, if those acts are
done in the course of his employment in his master's service.
The maxims applicable to such cases being res ondent suterior and that before alluded to quifacit per aliumfacitper se.
This rule, with some few exceptions, which will hereafter be
pointed out, is of universal application, whether the act of the
servant be one of omission or commission, whether negligent,
fraudulent or deceitful, or even if it be an act of positive malfeasance or misconduct, it it be done in the course of his ernployment, his master is responsible for it civiliter to third
persons :"Smith, M. & S., 151.
But to make the master responsible, the act of the servant
must be done in the course of his employment, that is, under
the express or implied authority of the master. Beyond the
scope of his employment, the servant is as much a stranger to
his master as any third person, and the act of the servant not
done in the execution of the service for which he was engaged, cannot be regarded as the act of the master: Id., 160:
Sher. & Redf. on Neg., §§ 55, 59, 62; Simpson v. London
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Ge'l Omnibus Co., 1 Hurl. & Colt. 541; Poulten v. Londm,
& South-western R. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. 535.
That there was in 'this case no express authority given to
the servant is conceded. Can such authority be implied under
the circumstances of the case, under the nature of the business
entrusted to his charge? The company contends that it cannot; and the tenth instruction Was asked on the ground that
there was no evidence to show such authority. For the plaintiff below, it is insisted that the servant was impliedly invested with such powers as were essential to the regular and
certain performance of his duties; that for the dispatch of his
business in certain emergencies, he must be considered as anthorized to suppress by force, if necessary, any interference
with, or obstruction of the quick and certain discharge of his
duties. Without undertaking to lay down a general rule to
govern all cases, it may safely be admitted that the servant is
invested with authority to use the necessary means to the
performance of the duties assigned him, and that the character
of the means that may be used will vary according to the nature of the duty to be performed and the attending circumstances. But in looking at the evidence it is to be noticed that
the assault complained of was not committed in endeavoring
to eject the plaintiff from the space inclosed by the tables,
over which the servant may be supposed to have had a special
control. The. plaintiff, according to his own statement, had
gone outside of the tables and was shaking his finger in Halpine's face, and addressing him with an opprobrious epithet.
It seems to us the assault was in no way calculated to facilitmte or promote the business for which the servant was employed by the master, nor could it have been supposed to be,
or intended as an act done with that view or object. It is not
a case of excess of force and violence in executing the authority of the master, but rather an act beyond such authority,
and foreign to the objects of the employment.
There was no evidencetending to show that Halpine had any
charge of the portions of the depot not allotted for the purpose
of checking baggage, neither did his employment imply any
authority or control over the persons of passengers, or others,
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Nor is this the case of an act
who might be found there
in
done from a wrong judgment regard to a matter committed
by the master to the discietion of the servant.
Another ground assumed is that the assault was an act of
the servant, done in part execution of the contract of carriage
between the plaintiff and the company. This is merely presenting the question in a different form, the principle being the same
as that already referred t6, namely: whether the act was done
in the execution or performance of the service for which the
servant was engaged. Whether the service to be rendered by
the master is in the, performance of a contract-or in the discharge of any other duty resting on him, can, it is conceived,
make no difference, the question being in either case, whether
the act is within the scope of the servant's express or implied
authority in respect to the master's service.
In order to withdraw the case from the operation of the
general rule, and hold the company responsible, on the ground
of its contract with the plaintiff as a passenger, it is necessary
to maintain that the company, in requiring the plaintiff to apply

to its servant for the purpose, and as the only means of getting
his baggage checked, impliedly undertook to vouch for and
warrant the good conduct of the servant toward the plaintiff
while the two were engaged in transacting the business.
Whether this position is tenable we do not find it necessary
in the decision of the case now before us, to express a definite
opinion.
The case was not tried on this theory in the court below, not
has this phase of the question been argued here. But if any
such rule of liability could be applied against the company, it

would necessarily impose the reciprocal duty upon the plaintii
to so demean himself toward the servant as not, by misbeha.

vior, to provoke a personal quarrel between them. The evi.
dence of the company on the trial tended strongly to prove that
the plaintiff, by his importunate conduct and abusive language
toward the servant, provoked a personal quarrel between them;
that the assault was the result of this quarrel, and that the
blow was inflicted by the servant as an act of personal resentment. If these facts had been found by the jury, the wrongful
act of the servant in striking the plaintiff could not be regarded
40
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as authorized by the master, nor as an act done by the servant
in the execution of the service for which he was engaged by the
master. The fact that the blow was inflicted with a hatchet
furnished by the master, to be used for a wholly different purpose, though in connection with the servant's business, was
wholly immaterial as respects the liability of the master.. If
he would not otherwise have been liable for the assault, the
fact that it was committed with his hatchet did not contribute
to make him so. The existence of the quarrel and its bearing
upon the character of the assault, was not noticed in the charge.
And if the jury found the quarrel to have been of the character which, as we have stated, the evidence tended to show it,
they were not advised as to the influence it might properly
have in enabling them to determine whether the assault was
an act done in the course of the servant's employment, or was
merely his own personal act.
It is true the charge stated the general rule correctly, but
the difficulty encountered by the jury, as shown by the nature
of the case and by the questions they propounded to the
court, was to ascertain how to apply the general rule to the
peculiar facts of the case in making up their verdict.
The reference made in the charge to the use for which the
hatchet was provided, was calculated, we think, to make an
erroneous impression on the jury on the very point on which
their verdict hinged. And furthermore, the charge, from the
generality of its terms, failed to give the jury the assistance
they ought to have received, in view of the facts of the case.
A charge, though not strictly objectionable in poinit of law, but
which leaves the jury to draw an incorrect inference from facts
in the case, material to the issue, will constitute good ground
for a new trial, when it is reasonable to suppose, from a consideration of the whole evidence, that a different verdict would
have been rendered if the jury had been fully instructed. The
charge ought not only to be correct, but to be so adapted to
the case and so explicit as not tobe misconstrued or misunderstood by the jury in the application of the law, to the facts as
they may find them from the evidence: Grah. & Water. on
New Trials 774; 18 Maine 436; 30 Conn. 343.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
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Circt Court of the Usited States, Districtof Virginia.
MATER OF CHARLES H. WYNNE, BANKRUPT.
'Debts secured by a deed of trust, made without fraud and without violation
of any provision of the Bankrupt Act, are to be preferred in payment tothe
claims of general creditors in the distribution of the proceeds of the bknkrupt
estate by the assignee in bankruptcy.
Sremle, that, though under the statute of the State a deed of trust takes
effect as to creditors only from and after the recording thereof, such a deedwill
take effect from that time, though such recording be after the passage of the
Bankrupt Act, if it .bebefore the Miing of the petition in bankruptcy.
It appears, from the Journal of the Senate of the United States, that the
Bankrupt Act of March 2,1867, was not in fact approved till Monday, the ith
of March; and this fact may be shown to support a deed recorded in the afternoon on the 2d of March, 1867; the validity of which is questioned upon the
ground that it was not recorded until after the approval of the act.
The landlord in Virginia has a lien on property of the tenant, being and
remaining upon the demised premises, for one year's rent accrued and to
accrue, in preference to any mortgage, deed of trust, or judgment.; and this
lien is to be satisfied bythe assignee in preference to such other liens as wellas
in preference to the claims of general creditors.

THE question in this case arose upon a petition of John
Johns, Jr., assignee of Charles H. Wynne, an involuntary bankrupt, asking for instructions as to the order of payment of
claims against the bankrupt estate. Wynne was adjudicated
a bankrupt on the petition of Wheelwright, Mudge & Co.,
filed in the District Court of the United States for the District
of Virginia on the 8th of June, 1867.
Enders, Paine, and Williams, claimed to be preferred in payment under a deed of trust dated August, 1866, which was
never recorded; or, if that claim be disallowed, then under a
deed of trust dated December 8, 1866, recorded March 2, 1867.
Haxall & Co also insisted on preference upon the ground
that Wynne was tenant under them of the warehouse which he
occupied, and that under the law of Virginia they as landlords had a lien for the rent due at the date of the petition,
to enforce which, on the 10th of June, 1867, they sued out a
distress warrant for $2,120, the amount of rent then due, and
caused the same to be levied on the goods then on the premises; and subsequently, on the 18th of July, 1867, sued out an
attachment, which was levied the 9am 3 day upon the same
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goods for $1,500, the amount of rent to become due on the 1st
of December, 1867.

Opinion by
CHAsE, 0. J.--We will consider first the claim to preference
in payment advanced in behalf of Enders, Paine, and Williams.
And we must say at once that so far as this claim is founded on the deed of August, 1866,- it cannot be admitted. It is
doubtless true that a mortgage or other conveyance made as
security for a debt evidenced for a note-or bond will operate
as security for the same continuing debt, though the evidence
6f it be changed by renewal or otherwise: Farmers'Bards v.
futua IRs. Society, 4 Leigh. 69. But in this case it is the
security itself which has been changed, and not the evidence
of the debt. The deed of December 8, 1866, was executed, as
it seems, in substitution for that of August, which thereupon
ceased to have any validity or effect.
The only question now to be determined is,therefore,whether
or not the deed of December created a lien upon the property
described in it, which the assignee of the bankrupt must satisfy
before applying any of its proceeds to the claims of the general
creditors. And it is to be observed that the deed is not con.
demned by the 35th section ofthe Bankrupt Act, which avoids
all assignments and other modes of preference made or attempted by insolvents, or persons in contemplation of insolvency, within four mouths before the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, or in case the person to be benefited has notice of
the intent within six months before such filing. The deed in
question was not made within either limit of time. It need
not, therefore, be here considered whether either period could
begin to run till after the passage of the Act. If the deed is
to be treated as void or inoperative as against the assignee by
operation of the act, it must be because of the effect of that
clause of the 14th section which provides "that all the property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors" "shall
in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of the assignee be at once vested in such assignee."
We do not doubt that the assignee takes the property in the
same plight in which it was held by the bankrupt when his
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petition was filed- Wisor v. HcLellan, 2 Sto. 495--subject
to such liens or incumbrances as would affect it if no adjudication in bankruptcy had taken place; but it is to be remembered that the assignee represents the rights of creditors
as well as the right of the bankrupt; and that any lien or incumbrance which would be void for fraud as against creditors if no petition had been filed or assignee appointed, will
be equally void as against the general creditors represented
by the assignee: Bradshaw, assignee, v. Klein, 7 Am. Law
Reg., N. S. 505 ; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Cur. 230.
This is what the act means when it vests -inthe assignee
"all property conveyed in fraud of creditors." It does not
make any conveyance or incumbrance fraudulent. It simply
clothes the assignee with the entire title, notwithstanding such
conveyance or incumbrance, and makes it his duty to invoke
the proper jurisdiction to annul the fraudulent proceedings.
And it may be remarked further that except to this extent the Bankrupt Act has no influence upon this case, so
far as the deed of trust is concerned.
Much was said in argument concerning the effect of the
record of this deed upon the 2d of March, 1867; and it was
strenuously urged that the deed was avoided by the effect of
the act which purports to have been approved on that day.
But we entirely concur with Mr. Justice SToRY in thinking
that where the question is as to the effect of a proceeding instituted on the same day on which an act affecting the validity
of such proceeding was passed the precise time at which the
act became a law may be properly inquired into: MAfatter of
Richardson, 2 Sto. 521. And in this we think ourselves
warranted also by the reasoning of the Supreme Court.
Gardnerv. Collector, 6 Wall. 511.
Now, it is in proof that the deed of trust was recorded about
4 P. M. on the 2d day of March, 1867; and it appears from
the Senate Journal of the session during which the act was
passed that the'day denominated the 2d day of March in the
journal, and in the approval of the Statute by the President,
consisted in fact of Saturday the second of March, of Sunday
the third, and of Monday the fourth until noon; and it appears
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further, that the bill which afterward became the bankrupt
law was not enrolled and delivered to the proper committee
to be presented to the President for his signature, until after
the recess, which ended at 7:30 P. M. on Sunday, and was
not reported to the Senate as actually signed by the President
until after 9:40 A. M. on Monday: Senate Journal, 2 Sess,
39th Cong., 1866-7, pp. 432-458.
It cannot be doubted, then, that the deed of trust was, in
fact, recorded nearly two days before the bankrupt bill became
a law ; and we think ourselves not only warranted on general
principles, but bound by the Constitution, to notice the fact
thus appearing upon the public records.
It may well be questioned, indeed, whether, if the act had
been approved before the recording of the deed, the effect of
the latter would have been altered. Nothing in the thirtyfifth section touches the deed; and nothing in any other, except the fourteenth. It may be, and we think it is, true that
if the deed had remained unrecorded when the petition in
bankruptcy was filed, the title of the assignee would have pre
vailed against any claim under the deed, for the assignee repre
sents the creditors,and the statute of Virginia--Rev.Oode,1860,
p. 566, § 5; see Winsor v. Kendall, 3 Sto. 515-expressly declares "any deed of trust void as to creditors," until and except
from the time it is duly admitted to record. It is not an unreasonable construction of the BankruptAct,as we think,which
regards it as vesting in the assignee for the benefit of creditors
in general, the estate of the bankrupt discharged of liens or
trusts, which, at the time of the petition, are invalid, inter
partes, under the statute of the state in which they are
claimed to exist. But we do not see how the mere enactment
of the law could affect a deed previously executed.
It is not, however, necessary to consider these points here.
The important question in the case is, whether under the fourteenth section of the bankrupt act this deed must be regarded
as inoperative against the assignee? The counsel for the assignee
has argued with much earnestness that the deed cannot be sustained without disregarding the implied effect of the first clause
or the second general -proviso of that section: "That no

CHAR

$S H. WYN1NE, BANKRUPT.

tiNl

mortgage of any vessel, or of any other goods and chattels
made as security for any debt or debts in good faith and for
present consideration, and otherwise valid and duly recorded
pursuant to any statute of the United States, or of any State,
shall be invalidated or affected hereby.
The argument is, that all mortgages not expressly saved
from the operation of the act by this clause must be held invalid; and, therefore, that all deeds of trust and other conveyances intended as security for debts, and not within the description of the mortgages expressly saved, must also be invalid.
But we cannot adopt this reasoning. It would be going too
far, we think, to hold all mortgages not included by the terms
of the description to be invalidated by the act. The clause
expressly saves certain mortgages, but it says nothing as to
others. Much less does it say anything as to deeds of trust,
or conveyances of analogous character. It leav6s all deeds
and instruments of writing not expressly saved to the general
principles of jurisprudence. To hold otherwise, would, we
think, be to give to the act an ex yostfacto operation contrary
to the intent of Congress.
And it would be quite gratuitous so to hold; for all just
rights of creditors as against instruments not described in this
clause, are fully protected by that which stands next in the
section and vests in the assignee for their benefit all the property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors.
The next question in this case, therefore, is, whether the
deed of trust by which the several liabilities of Enders, Paine,
and Williams, for Wynne were secured, was made in fraud
of the creditors of Wynne.
It has been argued that the deed of trust took effect as against
creditors only on the 2d day of March, 1867, and that the
recording of the deed on that-day was itself an act of bankruptcy. To maintain this proposition it is necessary to show
that the recording of the deed was the act of Wynne. But
clearly it was no act of his. The deed as against him was
operative from its date. It was then that all his interest in the
property described in it became vested by way of security in the
trustee. It was then that he delivered the deed and parted
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with all control of it. If the beneficiaries were satisfied with
the security affbrded by the deed unrecorded, there was neither
necessity nor obligation to record it. To record it was only
necessary to make it a valid security against other creditors;
and itwas not for Wynne, but for the creditors secured by the
deed, to determine whether it should be recorded or not. The
delivery of it for record was in no sense his act, but theirs. In
no sense, therefore, can it be regarded as an act of bankruptcy.
But it has been argued that as against creditors it must be
regarded as a deed executed at the date of the record, and
therefore as a deed creating a preference on that day, which
was within four months of the filing of the petition. There is
ingenuity and apparent force in this argument. But we think
there are decisive answers to it In the first place, the preference which the law condemns is a preference made within
the limited timne by the bankrupt, not a priority lawfully
gained by creditors; and we have just shown that the preference gained by the record was not a preference made by the
bankrupt. And, in the second place, the law which makes.
deeds of trust void "until and except from" the time of record
clearly makes them valid at and from that time. And it is
as much the policy of the Bankrupt Act to uphold liens and
trusts when valid as it is to set thema aside when invalid.
It is hardly necessary to add that this must be especially
true of a trust deed created and recorded before the approval
of the Bankrupt Act.
Was there any actual fraud in giving or taking the security created by the deed of trust? There has been no attempt
to maintain this.
It has been said that Enders, Paine, and Williams, on the
8th of December, 1866, knew that Wynne was insolvent, but
it is not denied that they had a right to obtain, if they could,
preference in payment under the laws of Virginia. They could
obtain it by direct transfer of property, or by deed of trust,
or by judgment and execution. Until after the passage of
the Bankrupt Act nothing but fraud in obtaining the preference, could invalidate it in whatever mode obtained.
It is not necessary to insist on this in the case before us, for
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we do not think that the evidence establishes as matter of fact
that at the date of the deed, or at the date of the record
Enders, Paine, and Williamswere aware of the actual insolvency of Wynne. They knew, indeed, that he was embarrassed in carrying on his printing and ptiblishing business,
but they seem to have fully believed that his property was
more than sufficient to pay all his debts.
On the whole, we are of the opinion that the deed of trust
must be supported as a valid deed, and that the creditors
named in it are entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of the
property embraced in it.
The remaining question to be considered is, whether at the
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcyRaxall & Co.,
had any lien for rent upon the property of the bankrupt.
This is the same property which was conveyed by the deed
of trust, and the solution of the question just stated may be
affected in some measure by the conclusion to which we have
come in respect to the validity ofthe lien created by that deed.
And in considering the question now to be disposed of, we
may lay out of view the proceeding by distress warrant and
also the proceeding by attachment. As we understand the
Bankrupt Act, all the rights and all the duties of the bank.
rupt in respect to whatever property, not expressly excluded
from the operation of the act, he may hold under .whatever
title, whether legal or equitable, and however encumbered,
pass to and devolve upon the assignee at the date of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. And all rights thus acquired
are to be enforced by process, and all duties thus imposed
are to be performed under the superintendence of the national
courts. :No lien can be acquired or enforced by any proceeding in a State court, commenced after petition is filed, though
in cases where jurisdiction has been previously acquired by
State courts of a suit brought in good faith to enforce a valid
lien upon property, such jurisdiction will not be divested:
Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612.

Whether, therefore, the distress warrant or the attachment
be regarded as a proceeding for obtaining or enforcing a lien,
each was equally unwarranted-Buckey v. Shouffer, 10 Md
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Rep. 149-and the restraining order as to both Was properly
issued: 1 Bank. Reg. Suppt. xi. If a lien for rent existed
it was a lien to be discharged by the assignee, and enforced in
the United States Court of Bankruptcy. If it did not exist it
could not be brought into existence by any proceeding whatever.
The real question is, Were the goods on the premises demised to the bankrupt subject to a lien for rent under the
State law when the petition was filed, independently of any
proceeding by distress or attachment ?
Liens are of various descriptions, and may be enforced in
different ways; but we think it sufficient to say here,what seems
to us well warranted in principle and authority, that whenever
the law gives the creditor a right to have a debt satisfied from
the proceeds of property, or before the property can be otherwise disposed of, it gives a lien on such property to secure the
payment of this debt. And we think that a lien of this sort is
given by the 12th section of title 41, chapter 138 of the revised
Code of Virginia, adopted in 1860. It expressly prohibits any
person having, by deed or trust, mortgage or otherwise, a lien
upon goods of a tenant on demised premises from removing
such goods without paying to the landlord the rent due and
securing the rent becoming due, not exceeding altogether one
year's rent; and it further requires any officer who may take
such goods under legal process to pay out of the proceeds the
rent in arrear and deliver to the landlord sufficient purchasers'
bonds for the payment of that becoming due. We cannot doubt
t at this statute creates a lien in favor of the landlord, and a
lien of a high and peculiar character. We have no concern
with the policy of this legislation ; it is upon the statute-book,
and the lien it creates must be respected and enforced.
The validity ofthe deed of trust in this case seems to us clear,
and it is not doubted by any one that in the absence of the
special circumstances supposed to affect it with invalidity the
lien of the creditors secured by it would be perfect. But these
creditors,by no process whatevercould appropriate these goods
to the satisfaction of their debts without paying or securing the
year's rent; and so of process under execution. The officer of
the law, at his peril, must pay the rent out of the proceeds.

